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A Renaissance of Political Culture?*
RobertW. Jackman,University
of California,Davis
Ross A. Miller,Santa Clara University

Theory:Cultural
differences
drivesignificant
elements
of politicalandeconomic
life.
ontraditions
Hypotheses:
(1) effective
govemance
hingescritically
ofcivicengagement;(2) politicalculture
driveseconomicperformance
fundamentally
anddemocraticstability.
Method:Reanalysisof twodatasets:(1) thefirst
includesinformation
collected
byPutnam
(1993) on a variety
ofpolitical,
economicandsocialindicators
forthe
20 Italianregions;(2) thesecondincludescomparable
information
collectedby
Inglehart
democracies.
(1990) fortheindustrial
Results:We findlittleevidencetoindicate
a systematic
between
relationship
political cultureandpoliticalandeconomicperformance.
Ever sinceMax Weber,manysocial scientistslookedat the 'right'cultural
attitudesand beliefsas necessaryconditions('prerequisites')foreconomic
progress,just as earliertheorieshad emphasizedrace, climate,or thepresence of naturalresources.In the 1950s, newlyfashionedculturaltheories
ofdevelopment
competedstronglywiththeeconomicones (whichstressed
capitalformation),withWeber's ProtestantEthic being modernizedinto
David McClelland's 'achievementmotivation'as a preconditionofprogress and intoEdward C. Banfield's 'amoralfamilism'as an obstacle.Actheveryattitudesalleged to be preconditions
cordingtomywayofthinking,
of industrialization
could be generatedon thejob and 'on the way,' by
certaincharacteristicsof the industrialization
process. (Hirschman1984,
99)
The beliefthatculturaldifferences
underliemanyoftheobservedvariationsacross politicalunitshas a long pedigree,especiallyamong students
of comparativepolitics.The classic exemplarof theargument
remainsMax
Weber's analysisof linkagesbetweenthe Protestant
Ethic and the rise of
capitalismin Europe ([1905] 1958). A benchmarkstudyof thebehavioral
* We wouldliketo thankDonnaBahry,HenryBrady,BruceBuenode Mesquita,Mary
Jackman,
and theeditorandreferees
RandolphSiverson,
fortheircomments,
and Robert
Putnamforgenerously
providing
us withaccesstohisdataon theItalianregions.We also
acknowledge
support
fromtheInstitute
ofGovernmental
Affairs
andtheAcademicSenate,
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to reconstruct
necessary
theanalysisareavailablefromtheauthors.
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revolution
in thestudyofpoliticsis AlmondandVerba's(1963) explorationoflinkages
between
civiccultures
anddemocracy
acrossfivesocieties.
Whilethepopularity
ofthisgeneralperspective
has waxedandwaned
overthepastthreedecades(e.g.,theessaysin Almondand Verba1980;
Barry1970,especiallychaps.3, 4), thepresumption
thatcultural
differencesdrivesignificant
elements
ofpolitical
lifeenjoysa wide
andeconomic
Twomajorrecent
currency.
studiesareespecially
noteworthy,
becausethey
are intended
as partof a "renaissance"ofpoliticalculture,
to use Inglehart's(1988) term.Thenewest,
MakingDemocracyWork(Putnam1993),
in contemporary
comparesregionalgovernments
that
Italyand contends
effective
ontraditions
ofcivicengagement.
In
governance
hingescritically
so doing,itparallelsCulture
Shift(Inglehart
1990),which,after
examining
a number
ofindustrial
concludesthatpoliticalculture
societies,
fundamentallydriveseconomicperformance
anddemocratic
stability.
Sucharguments
areofmorethanacademicinterest.
Forexample,itis
oftenassertedthatdemocratization
willcontinue
tofaceseverehandicaps
inthesouthern
European
cone,muchofLatinAmerica,
andmoststrikingly
in EastEuropeandRussia,giventhestrong
in
legacyof authoritarianism
therecent
havealreadyreceiveda gooddeal
past.Theseclaims,moreover,
ofattention.
to TheEconomist,
forexample,Putnam(1993) is
According
"a greatworkofsocialscience,worthy
torankalongsidede Tocqueville,
Pareto,and Weber"(The Economist1993,96), whileLaitinjudgesPutnam's bookto be a "stunning
in politicalculture
research"
breakthrough
(1995, 171).
Ourpurposeis to assessthebroadelements
ofthecultural
interpretation.We first
outlinethedistinctive
ofthisexplanation
attributes
andthen
evaluatethedataoffered
in lightof thosesame
byPutnamandInglehart
To whatextent
attributes.)
doestheavailableevidencepointtowell-defined
andenduring
Arethereanysystematic
typesofpoliticalcultures?
linkages
betweenpoliticalcultureandotheroutcomes?As willbecomeclear,our
resultsindicatethatthecultural
accountsofpoliticallifearesubstantially
inconjunction
overstated.
withother
weconTakingtheseresults
evidence,
cludeby suggesting
thatthepoliticalcultureapproachneedsto be recast
in institutional
termsthatmoredirectly
theroleof political
acknowledge
considerations
in explaining
performance.
The DistinctiveElementsof the PoliticalCultureApproach
offered
a uniqueexegesis
Earlystudiesofpoliticalculture
frequently
of politicalbehaviorwithina givenstate,oftencastin termsof national
'An earlierversionofPutnam'sanalysisoftheItalianmaterial
appearsinPutnam,
et
al (1983), and a parallelanalysisof theUnitedStatesis summarized
in Putnam(1995).
We focuson thecoreissuesInglehart
(1990) addressesin hisChapter1 ("Culture,Stable

634

and RossA. Miller
RobertW.Jackman

ofcourse,wasWeber'seffort
toidentify
Thenotableexception,
character.
thatmight
accountfortheassoofProtestantism
characteristics
thepeculiar
sizeoftheProtestant
in
population
therelative
between
ciationheobserved
thoseareasexperienced.
variousareasofEuropeandtheeconomicgrowth
thechallengeto MedievaldisciplinerepreWeber'sansweremphasized
valuesassociatedwithProtalongwithdistinctive
sentedbyProtestantism,
skills.2
entrepreneurial
estantism
thathe believedfostered
In an analogousmanner,
AlmondandVerba(1963) soughttoidentify
They
democratic
performance.
thefeatures
of politicalculturethatfoster
and subjectculbetweenparticipant
to thecontrast
paid specialattention
aremorelikelywhereparticipatory
thatdemocratic
outcomes
tures,
arguing
normsarewidespread,
andless likelywherevaluestakea predominantly
passive,subjectform.At aboutthesametime,McClelland(1961, 1963)
ofvaluesemphasizing
needforachievethathighconcentrations
suggested
Sinceneedforachievementaretheenginethatdriveseconomicgrowth.
skills,theparallelswith
mentis a syndrome
thatemphasizes
entrepreneurial
thatauthoritarian
regimes
suggested
Weberaredirect.McClellandfurther
thatstressed
highlevelsof needfor
werethelikelyoutcomeof cultures
Banfield
(1958,85) madethe
powerand low levelsofneedforaffiliation.
is a function
similar
thateconomicandpolitical"backwardness"
argument
towhichthenormis to "maxofhighlevelsofamoralfamilism
according
ofthenuclearfamily;
assumethat
short-run
advantage
imizethematerial,
amoralfamilism
resembles
both
all others
willdo likewise."Thusdefined,
andMcClelland'sviewsonlowlevels
AlmondandVerba'ssubjectculture
of needforachievement.
Theseconcernsare echoedin themorerecent
analyses.Forexample,Putnam's(1993) emphasison senseofciviccomof a civic
matchesAlmondand Verba'scase fortheimportance
munity
notselflesssaints,
"Citizensina civiccommunity,
though
politicalculture:
forpursuing
personal
thepublicdomainas morethana battle-ground
regard
interest"
(Putnam1993,88).
the
In contrast
studiesthatstressed
withtheearlynationalcharacter
aretakentoreflect
ofdifferent
then,cultures
politicalsystems,
uniqueness
thatframeand
becausethesearetheconcerns
andEconomicDevelopment"),
Democracy,
in Inglehart
(1988).
thesamematerial
analyses.He addressed
justify
his subsequent
by
as was underscored
withtheReformation,
evaporated
control
hardly
2Butreligious
intheRepublicoftheSaints.
associated
withCalvininGenevaandCromwell
thetheocracies
than
to theReformation
issuesmayindeedhavebeenlesscentral
DespiteWeber,doctrinal
out,"Prot1993).Indeed,as De Longhaspointed
(Manchester
strategic
andfiscalconcerns
anda
in manufacturing
is correlated
likeearlyspecialization
withotherfactors
estantism"
Europe,theirreligious
statesofWestern
ratio.Thus,forthenowwealthy
highinvestment
modem
toassimilate
goodproxyforthesocialcapability
tradition
hasbeen"a surprisingly
(De Long 1988,1148).
technology"
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thesyndrome
For someanalysts,
clusters
of attitudes.
coherent
relatively
(as in need for
sentiments
involvesthe prevalenceof entrepreneurial
whileforothersitis saidtoreveala senseofciviccommuachievement),
andPutAlmondandVerba,Inglehart,
nityorcivicvirtue(as inBanfield,
is thatthesyndrome
is coherent.
point,however,
nam).The important
aboutpoliticalculture
arguments
A secondpointfollowsimmediately:
withtheprevalenceof suchvalue clusters
concerned
are fundamentally
ofindividureflects
theattitudes
Whilethecultural
pattern
societies.
within
totheextent
thatitis widely
andsocialsignificance
als,itassumespolitical
arguments
arethusconAttheirheart,cultural
sharedacrossindividuals.
account,
ofsocieties.
ByWeber'soriginal
properties
cernedwithaggregate
attitudes
of entrepreneurial
forexample,it was thewidespread
diffusion
thatgaveriseto economicgrowth.
fostered
byProtestantism
modified
aredurable.Evenifslightly
syndromes
Third,thesecultural
effects
persistoverthelonghaul.
forces,theirfundamental
by short-term
(1993)traces
byWeber,andPutnam
described
Suchwasclearlythepattern
to legaciesofcivicentherecentsuccessofItalianregionalgovernments
in
backto theMiddleAges.The pointis also stressed
reaching
gagement
that"Peopleliveinthepastmuchmore
(1990,422) suggestion
Inglehart's
on bethantheyrealize."In otherwords,theimpactofdirectexperience
through
bynormspassedacrossgenerations
constrained
havioris severely
(see also,Verba1965,554; Moore1966,485). Cultural
earlysocialization
struchowindividuals
adapttochangesinincentive
factors
thuscondition
from
theperspective
whichdistinguishes
turesembodiedin institutions,
as Inglehart
andothershavepointedout.3
socialchoicearguments,
stems
culturalsyndromes
thesignificance
of theseenduring
Fourth,
Thus,Weber'sanalysis
fromthewayin whichtheydriveotheroutcomes.
on economicgrowth
to attract
attention
becauseof theeffects
continues
and it is hardto imaginethiscontinuing
he attributed
to Protestantism,
thatimputation.
Weberwas,ofcourse,quiteexpliciton
attention
without
anyformof "economic
thepoint.His fundamental
goal was toundermine
Marxtothe
thatvaluesarenotepiphenomenal,
determinism"
byshowing
(1958) wasequally
contrary
(see onthispoint,e.g.,Zeitlin1990).Banfield
was
so backward?
Becauseamoralfamilism
WhywasMontegrano
specific:
Putnamarguesagainstany "simpleecoendemic.In a parallelmanner,
insteadthatcultural
normsas
nomicdeterminism"
(1993, 152),insisting
forbotheconomic
areresponsible
in a senseofciviccommunity
reflected
1990,chap.8).
and politicalperformance
(1993,98-9; see also Inglehart
is incorrect
whenhe suggests
thatsocial-choice
3Thisis thecaseeventhough
Inglehart
On thispoint,
of economic utility.
solelywiththemaximization
arguments
areconcerned
(1993,51-2).
(1993),andPoundstone
see Riker(1990),Aldrich(1993),Jackman

636

RobertW. Jackmanand Ross A. Miller

clustersof
distinctive
In sum,thepoliticalcultureaccountidentifies
These durableclusters
attitudes
thatare widelyheldacrossindividuals.
thatarehighly
resistant
to change,and
worldorientations
formsubjective
of economicand politicalperforgenerator
are seen as thefundamental
emTheyare,inthissense,morecrucialthanobjectiveconditions
mance.4
change.
andtheyendurein thefaceof institutional
bodiedin institutions,
of thisclaim.As Moore(1966), Portes
Notethepolicyimplications
havenoted,theargument
allowsforslowchangeatmost,
(1976)andothers
orientations
as moreimportant
than,and largely
sinceit castssubjective
Ifregionaldifferences
incivic-mindof,objectiveconditions.
independent
ItalydatebacktotheMiddleAges,meaningful
ednessacrosscontemporary
is unlikely.
Pooreconomicandpoliticalperformance
changein thefuture
scholar,are
that,in thewordsof another
stemfromcultural
pathologies
boththe
perpetuates
inthedoublesensethatsocialization
"self-generating
inadpsycho-social
ofthegroupandconsequent
individual
cultural
patterns
equaciesblockingescapefrom[them]"(Valentine1968,141).
datafromtwodistinctive
marshall
considerable
PutnamandInglehart
As we
in support
of thecultural
perspective.
butcomplementary
settings
as it mightfirst
thisevidenceis notas persuasive
showbelow,however,
inPutnam's
analytheevidenceoffered
appear.We beginbyreconsidering
toInglehart'
s
inItaly,andthenturn
ourattention
sisofregional
governance
as a
democracies
in civicculture
acrosstheindustrial
studyofdifferences
whole.
Civic Virtuein Italy
of
Putnam'spurposeis toaccountforthevariancein theperformance
acrossItaly's20 regions.Theseregionsvarysignifipoliticalinstitutions
in
to Putnam,
and,according
cantlyin termsof wealth,social structure,
becausethe
is of specialinterest
termsof politicalculture.This setting
anopportunity
inthe1970sprovided
ofnewregional
creation
governments
thatassessesthe
to conductwhatPutnamcalls a "uniqueexperiment"
The studyitselfis
effect
ofpoliticalcultureon institutional
performance.
a widevariety
of social,ecodatasetconcerning
basedon an extensive
Whilethebulkofthisinformaofeachregion.
nomicandpolitical
attributes
tionrefers
to thecontemporary
period,Putnamalso includesquantitative
century.
material
datingbackto thelastpartofthenineteenth
inpolitical
variations
culture
outperform
Putnam
contends
thatregional
orientations
Putnam
labelsthesesubjective
chapter,
4Atvariouspointsinhisconcluding
suchas trust,
ofsocialorganization,
as "socialcapital,"bywhichhemeansthose"features
coordinated
ofsocietybyfacilitating
theefficiency
thatcan improve
norms,
andnetworks,
actions"(1993, 167).
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in explaining
economicdevelopment
Italianregionalgovernment
performancesincethe1970s.Apparent
support
forthisconclusion
comesfrom
a regression
of institutional
on current
performance
politicalcultureand
levelofeconomicdevelopment.
The estimates
we obtain(usingPutnam's
data)are:
Performance= 0.00 + 1.20 (CCV)
(5.7)

-

0.32 (ED)
(1.5)

.86, N = 20,

R2=

[1]

wherePerformance
is Putnam'smeasureof institutional
c.
performance,
1970,CCV andED arehismeasures
ofcurrent
civicculture
andeconomic
arereported
in parentheses.
andt-ratios
When
development,
respectively,
dataforearliercultural
traditions
are substituted
forcurrent
the
patterns,
estimates
are:
Performance= -0.04 + 1.16 (ECV)
(2.9)
R2

=

.74, N = 17,

-

0.19 (ED)
(0.5)

[2]

whereECV is Putnam'smeasureof earliercivicvaluesfromtheturnof
thecentury,
andother
terms
aredefined
as in[1].Estimates
likethesewould
seemto suggestthatwhiletheeffects
ofearliercivictraditions
areweaker
thanthoseofcurrent
civicculture,
bothoutperform
economicdevelopment
in theexplanation
ofinstitutional
performance.
Putnam'sstatistical
ofpoliticalculture
on demoanalysisoftheeffect
craticgovernance
reliesprimarily
on thethreevariables
injustidentified:
stitutional
civic community
and (earlier)civic traditions.
performance,
Each of thesevariablesis a composite
an
measurecreatedby combining
assortment
of indicators
on thebasis of a principal
components
analysis.
As is well-known,
thisis a statistical
"thatlinearly
transforms
procedure
an originalsetofvariablesintoa substantially
smallersetofuncorrelated
variablesthatrepresentsmostoftheinformation
in theoriginalset ofvari-

ables" (Dunteman
1989,7, ouremphasis.See also Flury1988).
Putnamextracts
a singlemeasureofeachofthethreevariablesmentionedabovefroma variety
of indicators.
He proceedsby specifying
in
advancethatno morethanone component
be extracted
at each phaseof
theanalysis.He thussimplyassumesthateach of thethreevariablesis
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The question,then,is whether
thecompositevariables
unidimensional.5
containedin the
mostof theinformation
constructed
by Putnamreflect
indicators
fromwhichtheyareformed.
composite
Measuring InstitutionalPerformance

based
To construct
his dependent
variable,Putnamselectsindicators
policydecision
operations,
on fourelements:
policyprocessand internal
(1993,
responsiveness
and bureaucratic
content,
policyimplementation,
elements.
are used to reflect
thesedifferent
66-73). In all, 33 indicators
on thegroundsthat"no
of indicators
Putnamdefendsthelargenumber
to ratetheregionsfairly.
singlemetric,
takenin isolation,wouldsuffice
a broad-based
assesstheseindicators
canundergird
however,
Collectively,
mentof institutional
performance"
(1993,66-7).6
an underidentified
model(sincethereare33 variTo avoidevaluating
insteps.First,
Putnam
considproceeds
ablesbutonly20 cases),theanalysis
whichhebreaks
downintothree
subsets.
Threefactors
ers24oftheindicators,
analyseson eachofthesesubsets,
aregenerated
fromseparate
component
ineachofthe
beextracted
withtheprovisothatnomorethanonecomponent
nineindicators,
thesethree
factors
threeanalyses.Alongwiththeremaining
inwhicha one-comarethensubjected
toanadditional
component
analysis,
inadvance(Putnam1993,75,Table3.2).
is againspecified
ponentsolution
Scoresfromthisfinalcomponent
analysisareusedtoformthecomposite
analyses.
ofperformance
inall ofPutnam'
s subsequent
measure
Table 1 reports
theestimates
principal
we obtainfromtwodifferent
analyses.The leftmarginliststhevariablesanalyzedby the
components
byPutnam:
policyprocess,policy
suggested
fourdomainsofperformance
andbureaucratic
responsiveness.
decisioncontent,
policyimplementation,
The estimates
columnof thetableare generated
by
displayedin thefirst
and correspond
closelyto thoseresolution,
assuminga unidimensional
have
eightofthe12 indicators
portedbyPutnam(1993,75). Specifically,
itis obviousthatPutnam's
analysescannot
component
5Giventhispriorspecification,
components
Besides,principal
ofthesevariables.
thenbe usedas a testofthedimensionality
a unidimensional
outcomeevenwhenthevariablesareknownto formmore
can generate
1967).
(Armstrong
thanone dimension
oftheregionsis unclear.Ifthebroadrangeofindica6Themeaning
ofa "fair"rating
is littlereasontosuspectsuchproblems
reliability
problems,
there
torsis chosentominimize
of indicators
natureof thedata.If,on theotherhand,thecollection
giventheaggregated
is notveryhelpvalidity,
theprocedure
is chosentominimize
concerns
aboutmeasurement
ful,forthereasonswe detailbelow.
likethatreported
matrix
inTable I areextracted
froma correlation
7Thecomponents
all ofthecorrelations
correlation
matrix;
byPutnam
(1993,199).Notethatthisis a pairwise
innovation
(variable
Legislative
are basedon thefull20 cases exceptforthoseinvolving
forfivecases.We explored
twoothersetsofestimates.
First,
#5),forwhichdataaremissing
11 variables.Second,we rewe imputed
valuesforthemissingcases fromtheremaining
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Table 1. PrincipalComponentAnalysesof Indicatorsof the
of ItalianRegionalGovernments
Performance
Institutional
=
(N 20; Italicizedloadings> .60)

Indicator
Policyprocess
1. Cabinetstability
2. Budgetpromptness
3. Statistical
services
Policydecisioncontent
4. Reformlegislation
5. Legislativeinnovation
Policyimplementation
6. Day care centers
7. Familyclinics
8. Industrial
policy
spending
9. Agricultural
10. Healthspending
11. Housingdevelopment
Bureaucratic
responsiveness
12. Responsiveness
Eigenvalue
of variance
Proportion
Cumulativeprop.of variance

Single-factor
solution

solution
Four-factor
(rotatedVarimaxloadings)
I

II

III

IV

.67
.57
.79

.32
-.03
.65

.77
.65
.21

-.05
.19
.19

.07
.69
.45

.87
.87

.74
.72

.42
.28

.12
.16

.22
.44

.86
.63
.59
.47
.50
.83

.92
.82
.27
.41
.33
.80

.26
-.02
.07
.41
.37
.22

-.06
.05
-.10
-.65
.76
-.31

.04
.00
.91
-.01
.02
.28

.61
5.95
.496
.496

.15
5.95
.496
.496

.85
1.61
.135
.631

.06
1.12
.093
.724

.17
1.03
.086
.810

halfof
reproduces
component
than.60 andtheextracted
loadingsgreater
is
however,
Maskedby thesenumbers,
thevariancein the12 indicators.
than
witheigenvalues
greater
components
ofthreeadditional
theexistence
1.0.

s
intheremaining
columnsofthetableshow,Putnam'
As theestimates
of
a reasonablerepresentation
solutiondoes notconstitute
single-factor
Whenwe abandon
in the12 indicators.
contained
mostoftheinformation
of
cutoff
in favorofthecustomary
eigenvalue
restriction
thesingle-factor
soluthatafour-factor
suggest
1.0(KimandMueller1978,43), thefigures
on the
components
principal
fromtheanalysisandperformed
innovation
movedLegislative
generates
11 indicators.
Apartfromtheobviousfactthatthesecondprocedure
remaining
themissingdata
waysof handling
variable,thesealternative
no loadingsfortheomitted
factorloadingsto thosedisplayedin Table 1.
yieldverysimilarestimated
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Table 2. Correlations(absolutevalue) amongand Principal
ComponentsAnalysisof Indicatorsof theBureaucratic
Responsiveness
ofItalianRegionalGovernments
(N = 20; Italicized loadings > .60)
Correlations
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Agriculture
satisfaction
Healthsatisfaction
0.14
Vocationalsatisfaction 0.08
letterreply 0.64
Agriculture
Healthletterreply
0.04
Vocationalletterreply 0.08

2.

3.

4.

Components
5.

0.15 0.34 0.16 0.76 0.14 0.42
0.03 0.71 0.33 0.05

6.

-

I

II

III

.14
.09
.98
-.93
.03
.01
-.05 -.92 -.08
.12 -.81
.02
.95
.01
.02
.93 -.06
-.09

tionis optimal.8Jointly,
thesefourcomponentsreproduceover 80% of the
variancein the 12 indicators,a clear improvement
in fit.9
A less obvious issue obscuredin Table 1 concernstheuse of composites generatedby an initialprincipalcomponentsanalysisas indicatorsin
subsequentcomponentanalyses. Take the case of bureaucraticresponsiveness,thelast of the 12 indicatorsin Table 1, whichwas itselfformed
froma priorcomponentanalysisof six indicators.The firstpanel of Table
2 displaysthe correlationsamong these six indicators.These correlations
letter
pointto three distinctclusters:agriculturalsatisfaction/agricultural
letterreply;and vocational satisfaction/
reply;healthsatisfaction/health
vocationalletterreply.
A principalcomponentsanalysisof thesame six measuresis reported
in the second panel of Table 2. These estimatesidentifythe same three
distinctcomponentsthatwere suggestedby the simplecorrelations.Each
ofthesethreecomponentsreflects,
moreover,a distinctive
policyarea (agriculture,health,and vocation,respectively)and each is therefore
readily
understood.To forcea single-component
solution,as does Putnam,is to
generatean uninterpretable
composite.The problemis simplycompounded
8Thefactor
loadingsshowninTable1 from
thefour-factor
estimates
arefrom
a varimax
rotation.
Estimates
fromobliquerotations
areverysimilar,
suggesting
thatthefourfactors
arereasonably
treated
as orthogonal.
9Whilethefirst
factor
remains
thelargest,
onlyhalfoftheindicators
loadunambiguIn particular,
ouslyon it.Furthermore,
thefourfactors
arenotclearlyinterpretable.
theydo
notcorrespond
withPutnam's
original
four-fold
classification
ofthe12items(policyprocess,
andbureaucratic
Theestipolicydecisioncontent,
policyimplementation,
responsiveness).
matesin Table 1 thusshowthatthe12 indicators
cannotbe usedto generate
a coherent,
unidimensional
measureof institutional
performance.
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whenthatcomposite
is subsequently
combined
with11 otherindicators
to
10
formone overallsummary
measureof "institutional
performance."
Measuring Civic Culture

Applying
parallelanalysestothefourindicators
ofcurrent
civiccommunity
(preference
voting,
referendum
turnout,
newspaper
readership,
and
thefrequency
of sportsandcultural
associations),
we finda pattern
more
consistent
withPutnam'sargument.
of an unSpecifically,
ourestimates
restricted
principal
component
modelshowthatthefirst
component
hasan
eigenvalue
muchgreater
thanthecutoff
of 1.0,andreproduces
85% ofthe
varianceinthefourindicators.
In contrast,
thesecondfactor
hasan eigenvalueof only.28. Although
thefigures
are a littleless clear-cut,
a onefactorsolutionalso fitsreasonably
well withthefiveindicators
of early
civictraditions:
ofmassparties,
strength
incidence
ofcooperatives,
meminmutualaid societies,
bership
electoral
andthelongevity
oflocal
turnout,
associations.
Ourestimates
of an unrestricted
modelindicatethatthefirst
factor
inthefiveindicators,
74% ofthevariance
whiletheeigenreproduces
valueforthesecondfactoris .78.
In themselves,
ofcourse,theabovepatterns
do notimplythatthetwo
extracted
reflect
either
current
civiccommunity
orearliercivic
components
traditions."
ofinterpretability
Suchquestions
do indiaside,thesepatterns
"0Asimilar
occurswiththeconstruction
problem
ofthecomponent
"housingandurban
Within
thiscomposite
development."
we identified
twodistinct
butcorrelated
factors
(r =
.41). Usingobliquerotation,
thefactors
andtheirloadingsare:
Variable
1. Subsidizedspending
capacity,1987
2. Facilitated
spending
capacity,1987
3. Subsidizedspending
capacity,1981
4. Housingspending
capacity(A), 1985
5. Housingspending
capacity(B), 1985
6. Urbandevelopment
spending
capacity,1979

Factor1

Factor2

.06
-.92
-.38
-.10
-.92
-.38

.94
-.08
.67
.86
-.07
.73

See Putnam
ofthemeasures
(1993,72-3) fora discussion
ofhousing
andurbandevelopment.
"For example,whilebothmeasures
includevoterturnout
as components,
theconnectionbetween
turnout
andcivicculture
is quiteunclear.Otherstudieshaveshownthatvoter
ingeneralis morea function
turnout
ofinstitutional
thancultural
differences
(Powell1986;
Jackman
1987;Jackman
and Miller1995),and thereis no a priorireasonto believethat
in Italy(eitherinelections
turnout
theearlierperiodorin referenda
during
thelater
during
period)shouldbe different.
Indeed,thereis evidencefromPutnam'sdatathatturnout
in
Italianreferenda
duringthe1970sand 1980svariedwiththenumber
ofpropositions
to be
withan institutional
voterfatigue
andMiller1995,
decided,consistent
hypothesis
(Jackman
a pooledanalysisof thefivereferenda
from1974to 1987acrossall
482-3). Specifically,
20 regionsyieldsa regression
coefficient
of -2.7 forthenumber
ofitemsperreferendum,
thatturnout
addedtoa referendum
suggesting
dropped
byjustunder3% foreachproposition
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cate thatthereis at leasta statistical
rationaleforthesingle-component
solution
ofhisexplanatory
employed
byPutnamin theconstruction
variables.Theempirical
withPutnam's
difficulty
analysisthusappearstohinge
on hisdependent
variable.
Reassessing the Link Between Cultureand Performance

We nowturnfromtheinternal
ofPutnam'smeasures
structure
toconsiderthelinkages
between
them.As indicated
above,Putnam
reports
strong
relationships
betweenhis composite
of institutional
performance
and his
of politicalculture(bothcurrent
civicvaluesand earlycivic
composites
Iftheseestimates
traditions).
arerobust,
we shouldobtainsimilarrelationshipsbetweenciviccultureandinstitutional
whenwe focus
performance
on theconstituent
thecomposite
partsofeach.If,however,
lack
measures
sucha disaggregation
willgenerate
coherence,
a muchmoremixedsetof
To gaugethesensitivity
oftheestimates
totheparticular
estimates.12
indicatorschosen,we regresseach individual
of institutional
indicator
performanceon current
civicvaluesandearlycivicculture,
forecocontrolling
nomicdevelopment.
Table3 summarizes
theregression
results
byreporting
theestimated
t-ratios
(absolutevalues).
Thefirst
rowofTable3 showsthet-ratios
fromtheregressions
ofthe
ofinstitutional
measure
onthecomposite
composite
performance
measures
ofcurrent
civiccommunity
andearlycivictraditions,
controlrespectively,
lingforeconomicdevelopment
(theset-ratios
correspond
tothosereported
in Equations[1] and [2] above).13
forciviccommunity
The t-ratios
and
civictraditions
in thistoprowarequitelarge(5.7 and 2.9, respectively),
whilethoseforeconomicdevelopment
are muchsmaller(less than2.0).
Calculationslike theseformthebasis forPutnam'sconclusions,
as we
notedearlier.
A considerably
moremixedpictureemergesfromthet-ratios
forthe
ofinstitutional
insuccessive
individual
components
performance
displayed
on thenumber
ofpropositions
is fromButlerandRanney1994,Appendix
(information
A,
andthemaximum
proposition/referendum
ratiowas 5 in theperiod).
"2Our
validation
analysesfollowthelogicofconstruct
(e.g.,ZellerandCarmines
1980).
of thecomposite
Thus,we are concerned
withevaluating
(a) thecoherence
measuresof
cultural
valuesandinstitutional
performance
takenseparately
and(b) thelinkagesbetween
ofcultural
theindicators
valuesandtheindicators
of institutional
performance.
3We report
theabsolute
valueofthet-ratios
simply
tosummarize
thevariousregression
is significant
atorbeyond
a t-ratio
of2.11orgreater
analyses.With17degreesoffreedom,
the.05 level,anda t-ratio
of 1.74is significant
atorbeyondthe.10 level.Following
convention,we use 2.0 as an approximate
cutoff
pointforstatistical
significance.
As willbecome
clearinTable3,themajority
oftheestimated
coefficients
havet-ratios
considerably
lessthan
2.0,whichmeansthatthesignsofmostoftheregression
coefficients
andrelated
estimates
not
in thetablesarequiteunreliable.
reported
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Table 3. T-ratiosfromRegressionsof Institutional
Performance
and
its Componentson CivicValues and EconomicDevelopment
(ItalianRegionalData, N = 20)
DependentVariable
OverallInstitutional
Performance
PolicyProcess
Cabinetstability
Budgetpromptness
services
Statistical
PolicyDecisionContent
Reformlegislation
Legislativeinnovation
PolicyImplementation
Day care centers
Familyclinics
Industrial
policy
Agricultural
spending
Local healthspending
Housingdevelopment
Bureaucratic
Responsiveness
Responsiveness

Currentculture*

Early culture**

CCV

ED

ECV

ED

5.7

1.5

2.9

0.5

3.2
1.2
1.2

1.9
0.0
1.3

1.5
0.7
1.4

0.8
1.3
0.7

2.4
0.9

0.0
0.6

2.8
1.6

0.7
0.3

2.6
1.4
1.9
0.4
3.0
2.5

0.7
0.5
0.7
0.7
1.7
0.8

4.0
1.4
0.8
0.1
2.3
1.9

1.5
0.4
1.7
1.0
1.3
0.2

2.7

1.7

3.8

3.1

*Absolutet-ratios
fromregressions
on current
civicvalues(CCV) and current
economic
development
(ED).
**Absolute t-ratios
fromregressions
on earlycivic values(ECV) and current
economic
development
(ED).

rows of Table 3. Of the 12 regressionsin the firstpart of the table for
currentculture(witheconomic developmentcontrolled),only six have tratiosforcivic community
exceeding2.0. Two of thesesignificant
t-ratios,
moreover,are for "housing development" and "bureaucraticresponsiveness," bothof whichare compositemeasuresthatare difficult
to interpretforthereasonswe have alreadygiven.The resultsforthecorresponding regressionsin the second part of the table involvingearly cultural
traditions
are even less encouraging.Of these 12 regressions,
onlyfour(or
one-third)have t-ratiosgreaterthan2.0.
The robustnessof Putnam'sconclusionsis further
obscuredwhen we
substitutethe componentindicatorsof culture(referendaturnout,
preference voting,newsassociations,and sportsassociations)fortheoverallcomposites employed as explanatoryvariables in Table 3 (resultsnot displayed). Withthe compositemeasureof institutional
as the
performance
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dependentvariable,the resultsare relativelyconsistent,withthreeof the
in thetop row larger
fourt-ratiosforthecomponentsof civic community
than2.0. This apparentconsistencyfades, however,when we substitute
forthecomposite
the 12 separatecomponentsof institutional
performance
dependentvariable.
Of the distinctindicatorsof civic culture,referendaturnouthas the
mostconsistenteffectson thedifferent
perforcomponentsof institutional
(58%) have
mance,buteven here,only seven of 12 estimatedcoefficients
the number
t-ratiosof at least 2.0. For the preferencevotingcoefficients,
of t-ratiosgreaterthanor equal to 2.0 dropsto fiveof 12 (42%). Only two
of the 12 coefficients
and none
(17%) forsportsassociationsare significant,
of the newspaper-readership
coefficients
meet conventionallevels of statisticalsignificance.Indeed,of the48 possible estimates,only 14 (or less
on an indicatorof civic
coefficients
than30%) have statistically
significant
community,
and fiveof theseare forhousingdevelopmentor bureaucratic
responsiveness,
measureswhose meaningis ambiguous,as we arguedearlier.That so fewof thecoefficients
forassociationsand newspaperreadership reflecta systematiceffectis of particularinterestgiven thecentrality
of associationmembershipand themass media in mostaccountsof civic
vitality;indeed,Putnamapprovinglyquotes de Tocqueville on the point
(1993, 92).
of theestimatedcoefficients
forcultureto the
This extremesensitivity
particularcomponentindicatorsunderconsiderationunderminesthe culThe onlycivic community
turalargument.
indicatorthatsystematically
afin at least a majorityof thetests(seven of
fectsinstitutional
performance
12) is referendaturnout.Whetherthishas any implicationsfora political
is unclear,forthereasonsadvanced earlier.
cultureinterpretation
The case fora culturalexplanationis even weakerwhenthecomposite
is decomposedintoits fiveconstituent
measureof earlyculturaltraditions
parts.Again,we do notdisplaytheestimateshere,buttheeffectsare minito Putnam'soverallmeasureof institumal even ifwe restrict
ourattention
None of thefiveseparateelementsof earlycivic traditionalperformance.
tions (the strengthof mass-basedparties,the incidenceof cooperatives,
in mutual-aidsocieties,electoralturnout,
and theincidenceof
membership
local associations)has a t-ratioof at least 2.0 (althoughtwo of themare
veryclose at 1.9). The estimatesare stillmoreerraticwhenthedependent
variableis further
disaggregated.
In all, we findverylittleindicationfromtheItaliandata to suggestthat
institutional
performance
dependsin any appreciablemanneron cultural
While thereis a statistical
forthemeasuresof civic
traditions.
justification
community
developedby Putnam,thosemeasuresdo notaddressdistributionsof culturalvalues directly.More troubling
is thefactthatthemeasure
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ofinstitutional
performance
cannotbejustified
evenon statistical
grounds.
forlinkingculturalvaluesto
As a result,thesedataprovideno warrant
politicalperformance.
Civic Virtuein the IndustrialDemocracies
We nowturnto a different
setting
fora further
empirical
evaluation
ontheanalysesreported
ofthecultural
Thiscenters
argument.
byInglehart
(1990),whoexaminesbroadercross-national
variations
acrosstheindusformsofperfortrialdemocracies,
andwhoseanalysesfocuson different
mance.In addition,Inglehart's
measuresof civic cultureare primarily
inmass
basedonsurvey
datathatmoredirectly
reflect
differences
potential
We first
civicorientations.14
examineInglehart's
measures
ofpoliticalculin
ture,andassessthelinkagesbetweenthesemeasuresand otherfactors
orderto evaluatetheirconstruct
validity.
MeasuringPoliticalCulture
AlmondandVerba(1963),Inglehart
Following
identifies
thefollowing
sevenspecificindicators
of masspoliticalculture:
1. Levelsof overalllifesatisfaction,
2. Levelsof interpersonal
trust,
3. Supportforrevolutionary
change,
4. Support
forthecurrent
socialorder,
5. Levelsofpoliticaldiscussion,
6. Levelsofpostmaterialist
values,
of thepopulation
7. Proportion
Protestant.
six indicators
ofpoliticalculturearefromInglehart
Measuresof thefirst
(1990,chap.I), andrefer
totheearly1980s.Further
detailson thesemeain theAppendix.
suresareprovided
Data on thelastindicator,
percentage
c. 1965,arefromTaylorandHudson(1972).'5
Protestant
We havealreadyemphasized
theconsistent
claimincultural
accounts
liketheseforma coherent
describes
thatindicators
cluster.
Thus,Inglehart
thefirst
fiveoftheseitemsas constituting
ofpositive
"a syndrome
attitudes
towardtheworldinwhichonelives(1990,41). Similarly,
postmaterialists
are saidto placespecialweighton qualityof lifeissuesandon thesense
ofcommunity,
bothofwhichinvolvethealtruism,
and
cooperative
spirit,
4To be sure,Putnam(1993, 109-18) does briefly
comparescattered
surveydataon
levelsof powerlessness,
and satisfaction
withlifewithhis measureof current
trust,
civic
community,
buthisanalysesdo notrelyprimarily
on theseopiniondata.
thevariableused in Table 4 is thenaturallogarithm
"Givenitsdistribution,
of the
percentage
Protestant
(plus 1).
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CorrelationsamongSeven Componentsof
Table 4. Product-moment
PoliticalCulture,circa 1980
1.
1. Satisfaction
2. Trust
3. % Revolutionary
4. % Conservative
5. % Materialist
6. % Womendiscussing
7. % Protestant

.55
-.57
.36
-.66
.62
.76

2.
22
-.52
.43
-.43
.45
.61

3.
18
18
-.40
.41
-.45
-.24

4.

5.

18
18
18

21
19
17
17

-.36
.55
.48

-.61
-.68

6.
20
18
15
15
18
.76

7.
24
22
18
18
21
20

on
six indicators
arefromInglehart
Sources:Data on thefirst
(1990,chap.1); information
is thenatural
ofthepercentage
Protestant
scoresfromTaylorand
Protestantism
logarithm
Hudson(1972).
andentries
abovethe
belowthemaindiagonalarepair-wise
correlation
coefficients,
Entries
arecalculated.
maindiagonalindicatethenumber
ofcases forwhichthosecorrelations

generalcivic-mindednesstypicallyassociated with civic virtue.Finally,
Protestantism
is also describedas partof thissyndrome(1990, 50).
Is thereevidencethatthesemeasuresofpoliticalcultureforman underas claimedby Inglehart?
Table 4 displays
lyingcoherentclusterofattitudes,
the correlationsamong the seven indicatorsof politicalculture.Because
some of theseindicatorsare available formorecountriesthanothers,we
below themaindiagonal,and indireportpair-wisecorrelationcoefficients
cate thenumberof cases over whichthecorrelationsare calculatedabove
the main diagonal."6Given the coding of the variables,the signs of the
featureof thesecorrecoefficients
are all as expected.Yet themoststriking
lationsis theircomparativelymodestsize, given thattheyare calculated
in thetablerange
fornationalaggregates.Ignoringsigns,the21 correlations
from.24 to .76, witha mean value of .52. Only two (approximately10%)
exceed .70, whichtranslates
intoan R2 of .50. This meansthatonlyin these
twopairingsof indicatorsis morethanhalfthevarianceshared.Acrossthe
remaining19 pairings,the sharedvariancesare considerablysmaller.The
in Table 4 challengestheassertion
modestsize of mostof thecorrelations
thattheseindicatorsare all componentsof a singleenduringand distinctive
clusterof culturaltraits.
does not
cluster,Inglehart
his claimthatthesevariablesforma coherent
"6Despite
analysis)thatincludesall thevariablesshown
matrix
(orfactor
himself
report
a correlation
in Table 6. A factoranalysisof thesevariablesseemsunwisein viewof (a) thelack of
inTable6 and(b) thevariation
acrosstheitemsintheincidence
structure
inthecorrelations
of missingdatathatis evidentabovethemaindiagonal.
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Sources of Political Culture
An alternativeway of gaugingwhethertheseindicatorsforma welldefinedconfiguration
is to see iftheyare generatedby thesame underlying
economic conditions.Civic virtueshouldbe more widespreadwithinthe
wealthierdemocracies,all else equal, forthereasonsadvancedby Inglehart
(amongotherthings,nationalwealthtakestimeto accumulateand is thereforea long-term
conditionthatchangescomparatively
slowly).By thesame
token,civic virtueshouldbe less sensitiveto shorter-term
economicconditions(e.g., economicgrowthin therecentpast) or economicconditionsthat
are moreproneto temporalfluctuation
The
(e.g., levels of unemployment).
claim thatthe indicatorsforma coherentculturalclusternecessarilyimplies, moreover,thattheyshouldeach respondin a similarmannerto the
same economicconditions.
Table 5 reportstheestimatesfromregressionsoftheindicatorsofpolitical cultureon economicconditions.These estimatesinvolve separateregressionsof thefirstsix componentsfromTable 4 (all of whichentailvalues measuredin 1980 or veryshortlythereafter),
butexclude themeasure
of Protestantism,
whichis forc. 1965. The six elementsare regressedon
(a) nationalwealth,as indexedby thelogarithmof real GDP percapitafor
1980, (b) economic growthover the previous decade, as measuredby
growthin real GDP per capita (1970-80), and (c) thelevel of unemploymentfor1980.17The culturalargument,
of course,impliesthattheexplanatoryvariablesin Table 5 should have similareffectson each of the six
componentindicators.
Fromthefirst
rowof thetable,we see thatnationaldifferences
in levels
of life satisfaction
are sensitiveto thelevel of economicdevelopmentand
economic growthover the priordecade, but do not vary with levels of
unemployment.
Specifically,levels of satisfactionare higherin wealthier
countriesand in thosethatexperiencedlowergrowthratesovertheprevious
10 years.This patternis repeatedin theestimatesforthepercentagematerialist. The sign reversalshere merelyreflectthe coding of the dependent
variable(percentagematerialistminuspercentagepostmaterialist),
so the
in thefifth
coefficients
row show thatpostmaterialism
increaseswithlevel
of developmentand decreaseswithpriorgrowth.In contrast,
whenwe turn
to levels of interpersonal
trustin the second row of the table, only the
coefficient
forunemployment
is statistically
significant.
Distrustseems to
increasewithunemployment,
butis insensitiveto eitherthelevel of developmentor growthin therecentpast. A similarpatternis obtainedwiththe
percentageof womendiscussingpoliticsin thebottomrowof thetable(the
"7Dataforlevelsandgrowth
ofrealGDP arefromSummers
andHeston(1991);those
forlevelsof unemployment
arefromOECD (1991).
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Table 5. Regressionsof ComponentsofPoliticalCulture,circa 1980,
on Basic EconomicConditions[Coefficients
(t-ratios)]

DependentVariable
Satisfaction

Per
capita
GDP
1980

GDP
growth
1970-80 Unemployment Constant R2

1.19* -2.96*
(2.6)
(2.2)
Trust
0.73
-28.91
(0.1)
(1.1)
% Revolutionary
-3.93*
10.20
(2.0)
(1.5)
% Conservative
10.80
25.53
(1.8)
(1.2)
% Materialist
-19.16*
57.98*
(2.6)
(2.6)
% Womendiscussing 11.94 -41.41
(1.2)
(1.2)

-.02
(0.5)
-2.46*
(2.6)
0.52*
(2.2)
-1.84*
(2.5)
0.29
(0.4)
-1.88
(1.9)

-2.76
(0.6)
56.65
(0.7)
35.94
(1.8)
-71.53
(1.2)
181.33*
(2.5)
-30.42
(0.3)

N

.60 20
.37 18
.58 16
.55

16

.64 19
.46

18

see Table 1. GDP dataarefromSummers
andHeston
Sources:Forthedependent
variables,
dataarefromOECD (1991).
(1991) andunemployment
* Starred
coefficients
aremorethantwicetheirstandard
errors.

forwhichhas a t-ratioof 1.9), suggestingthatpoliticalinterest
coefficient
declineswithincreasingunemployment.
Finally,thetwo itemson support
in part
fortheexistingsocial orderbehave in a parallelmanner(reflecting
the factthattheyare based on different
responsesto the same question).
Supportforthecurrentorderis higherin wealthiercountriesand in those
withlower unemployment,
but does not varywithrecentgrowth."8
Overall, the patternsapparentin Table 5 reinforcethe inferenceswe
drewfromTable 4. The six "components"of politicalculturedo notform
a coherentgeneralstructure:
factors.
instead,theyare sensitiveto different
Even thefirstthreecomponentsin thetabledo notclustertogether,
despite
Inglehart'suse of thesethreeas a summarymeasureof politicalculturein
his Figure 1.6 (1990, 44). The similaritiesthatare evidentin Table 5 are
moreover:why,forexample,shouldlifesatisfacnotclearlyinterpretable,
tion and materialismresponddifferently
to economic conditionsthando
levels of trustand thepercentageof womenwho discuss politics?Finally,
insofaras growthin the recentpast and levels of unemployment
reflect
'8Thesamepatterns
as thosereported
inTable5 areobtained
ifthemeasure
ofeconomic
growth
is takentocoveran evenshorter
period(1975-80)thatfocusesoneconomicperformanceaftertheoil shockof 1974.
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shorter-term
economicpatterns,
thefactthatthesetwo variablesinfluence
some butnotall of thecomponentsis incompatiblewiththeinterpretation
thatthe latterrepresentenduringculturalvalues.19

ofPoliticalCulture
Effects
The questionthatremainsis whetheranyor all of theseculturalindicatorsinfluenceotheroutcomes.Inglehart'sclaim thattheydo echoes the
earliersuggestion(Almondand Verba 1963) thatcivic virtueis essentialfor
a successfuldemocracy,and anticipatesPutnam's(1993) parallel linkage
betweencivic virtueand effectivegovernance.Inglehartgoes on to suggest
thatcivic virtuealso impingeson economic growth.We brieflydiscuss
theseissues in turn.
Inglehart'sconclusionthatcultureinfluencesthesuccess of democracy
dependson two pieces of evidence. First,he reportsa correlationof .85
betweenlifesatisfaction
and democracy(1990, 42). Second,he claims that
the effectsof economic developmenton democracyare mediatedby the
of thelabor forcein thetertiary
proportion
sectorand by "civic culture"
in levels of lifesatisfaction
(as reflected
and interpersonal
and support
trust,
forrevolutionary
change). The meaningone attachesto theseassociations
hingesdecisively,however,on how one identifies"successful democracies."
The particularmeasureused by Inglehartis a count of the years of
continuousdemocracyfrom1900 through1986. The measureand theresearchdesignwithinwhichitis employed,however,containseveralanomalies. First,as one would correctlyexpectgiven the titleof his book, the
countriesanalyzedby Inglehartconsistalmostexclusivelyof theadvanced
industrialsocieties(thenotableexceptionsin his Figure1.5 are Argentina,
Hungary,and SouthAfrica[Inglehart1990,42]). Theirlevelsofdemocratic
as of theearlyto middle 1980s were,as a result,all roughly
performance
equivalent(see Bollen 1993). Under this procedure,however,Belgium,
"ClarkeandDutt(1991)founda similar
Theresults
from
theirpooledcrossproblem.
sectional
timeseriesanalysisofeightcountries
overtheperiod1976-86indicate"thatsharp
in unemployment
increases
intheearly1980smakeitappear,basedon thefour-item
measure,thattherewas a substantial
shifttowardpostmaterialism
in severalcountries."
They
concludethattheupward
trend
stemmed
morefrom"thefailure
toincludeanunemployment
in themeasure"thanfromchangesin underlying
statement
values(1991,918). In another
pooledanalysisof someof theseitemsfromeightcountries,
Clarke,Dutt,and Kornberg
(1993) providefurther
evidenceofthesensitivity
oftheseitemsto short-run
economicand
political
circumstances
including
inflation,
unemployment,
fluctuations
insupport
forpolitical parties,
andrally-around-the-flag
events.DuchandTaylor(1993)reachtheparallelconclusionthatapparent
shiftsin postmaterialism
stemdisproportionately
fromtheinclusion
ofaninflation
itemintheindex.Alloftheseanalysesunderscore
thesensitivity
ofInglehart's
measures
to short-run
rather
thanlong-term
economicconditions.
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whichis codedas continuously
democratic
since1900,is measured
as being
threetimesmoredemocratic
thanFrance,whosedemocratic
history
is
in 1958.Thejudgment
codedas beginning
thatBelgiumreallywasapproximatelythreetimesmoredemocratic
thanFranceby 1980 is untenable,
givenanyreasonablesetofcriteria
fordemocratic
performance.
Second,Inglehart's
use of 1900 as thestarting
dateignoresthefact
ofdemocracy
thatthemeaning
hasevolvedconsiderably
overthiscentury,
especiallyin termsofwhatDahl (1971) has labelledinclusiveness.
When
onerecallsthetypical
restrictions
onthesuffrage
basedongender,
income,
andrace90 yearsago,theimplications
ofthisevolution
becomeself-evident:since 1900,noneof thecountries
so codedby Inglehart
has been
in a contemporary
continuously
democratic
sense.This problemunderminesall attempts
to identify
a binarystarting
dateafterwhicha country
can be considered
democratic
andbeforewhichitcannot.
Third,Inglehart's
analysisdoes nothelpaccountforlevelsof democraticperformance
becausehisresearch
designselectscases according
to
their
(high)valuesonthatdependent
variable(see Geddes1990).Variations
inpolitical
culture
(oranyother
potential
explanatory
variable)cannotlogicallybe used to accountforfundamentally
uniform
degreesof political
ThatInglehart's
measureincludes
democracy.
morevariance
doesnotobviate theproblem.
It simplymeansthathismeasureinadvertently
conflates
withat leastoneothervariable-political
democracy
stability
(Bollenand

Jackman1989).2o

Giventheabove,theassociations
reported
by Inglehart
shouldmost
be takento reflect
plausibly
betweenculture
covariation
andstability,
not
betweencultureand democratic
performance.
do notadTheytherefore
dresstheissuesthathavemotivated
scholars,at leastsinceAlmondand
Verba,concerning
theimpactof democratic
(i.e.,civic)valueson democraticperformance.
theseassociations
Further,
cannotlogicallysustainthe
causalargument
atstake,becausethatargument
impliesthatthedistribution
ofvaluesidentified
in surveys
intheearly1980sgaveriseto
administered
thestability
of constitutional
ordersoverthepreceding85 years.
20DuchandTaylorpointtoa related
problem:
"recentsurvey
evidencefrom
theSoviet
UnionandEasternandCentralEuropesuggeststhemasspublicembracespostmaterialist
valuesin spiteoftheseriouseconomicpenury
theyhaveendured"(1993,753). Inglehart
explainsthisapparent
as follows:"thecrucialfactor
anomaly
is security
during
one'sformativeyears,anditis clearthatthecommunist
ofEastern
regimes
a relatively
Europeprovided
secureexistence.. ." (Inglehart
1992,14,quotedinDuchandTaylor1993,753). Inmaking
thisargument
Inglehart
confounds
economicsecurity
andeconomicdevelopment.
Theresult
is an unfalsifiable
argument:
"economicsecurity
drivespostmaterialism,
butifwe see high
levelsof postmaterialism
and low economicdevelopment
at thesametime,thenfactors
otherthaneconomicwealthhavepromoted
economicsecurity"(Duch and Taylor1993,
753).
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If theclaim foran effecton democracyis weak, so too is theassertion
thatcivic virtueinfluenceseconomic growth.To be sure,Inglehartdoes
label his discussionas "speculationwithdata" (1990, 40). On the other
hand,his appraisalconcludeswiththefollowing:
variables....Theavailbycultural
itselfis influenced
Economicdevelopment
thatculture
is notjusta consequence
ableevidencesupports
Weber'sinsight
of economics;it can shapethebasic natureof economicand politicallife
1990,65).
(Inglehart
As evidence,Inglehartcomparesthemodestcorrelationbetweenthelevel
of economicdevelopmentand economicgrowthrates(r = -.22), withthe
and economicgrowth
"far stronger"relationship
betweenpostmaterialism
duringtheperiod 1965-84 (r = -.54). Thus, whilea nation'swealthcan
affecttherateat whichitseconomygrows,Inglehartmaintainsthatit does
so ". . . only insofar as it brings cultural change" (1990, 64). In this vein,

withevidencefromthe
converges
perspective
Evidencefroma cross-national
feedback
toa long-term
cultural
processofnegative
individual
level,pointing
linkedwitheconomic growth.... The wealthiersocieties are least likelyto

publicsseemtoproducehighecopublics,butMaterialist
produceMaterialist

nomicgrowthrates.... Since one's values tendto reflecttheconditionspre-

yearsbeyears,we allowa lag of aboutthirty
vailingduringone's preadult
andmassvaluepriorities]...
(Inglehart
tween[levelofeconomic
development
1990, 57).

of r = -.59 beTo substantiate
theseclaims,Inglehartreportsa correlation
tweena nation'spercapitaGNP in 1950 and thepercentageof thenational
populationholdingMaterialistvalues,c. 1980 (1990, 57).2' This argument
prevailingin theearly
ofmass value priorities
impliesthattheconfiguration
ratesinthefollowrelatedtoeconomicgrowth
1980sshouldbe systematically
estimateseparateregressionsof 1980-88 RGDP
ing period.We therefore
s measuresofculturalvaluesfor
percapitagrowthrateson each ofInglehart'
for1980 RGDP percapita(see Table 6).
c. 1980,controlling
betweenculture
The analysisin Table 6 indicatesthattherelationship
Out of seven separate
and economicgrowthratesis weak to nonexistent.
is statistiestimateformass value priorities
notone coefficient
regressions,
On the otherhand,the estimateforthe level of national
cally significant.
2 Inglehart's
oneconomicgrowth
discussion
ofchangesinthesignsofthecoefficients
Theissuesat stake
is somewhat
puzzling.
periodsareinvestigated
thatoccurwhendifferent
areconverging
industrial
economies
aboutwhether
herearepartofan ongoingcontroversy
(e.g.,De Long 1988;BaumolandWolf1988;andMaddison1991).
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Table 6. Regressionsof CurrentGrowthRates (1980-88) on
Different
for1980 GDP
CulturalValues Controlling
[coefficients
(t-ratios)]
Measure of
PoliticalCulture
Satisfaction
Trust
% Revolutionary
% Conservative
% Materialist
% Womendiscussing
% Protestant

Culture
c. 1980

Per capita
GDP 1980

Constant

R2

N

-0.04
(1.3)
0.00
(1.5)
-0.01
(1.3)
0.00
(0.2)
0.00
(1.5)
-0.00
(0.4)
-0.00
(0.4)

0. 19*
(3.6)
0.12*
(2.7)
0.06
(1.0)
0.11*
(2.3)
0.15*
(3.0)
0.06
(1.5)
0.15*
(3.3)

-1.3 1*
(3.5)
-1.07*
(2.8)
-0.39
(0.7)
-0.91*
(2.1)
-1.28*
(2.7)
-0.43
(1. 1)
-1.21*
(3.0)

.42

24

.45

22

.38

18

.31

18

.35

21

.12

20

.37

24

Sources:see Tables6 and7.
aremorethantwicetheirstandard
*Starred
coefficients
errors.

wealthis in the expecteddirectionin all cases, and significant
in all but
two of theanalyses.22In sum,thereis no systematicrelationshipbetween
any indicatorof cultureand currenteconomicgrowthrates.
Taken together,the estimatespresentedin Tables 4 through6 offer
scantsupportfortheargumentsadvancedby Inglehart.First,our analyses
challengehis arguments
regardingtheexistenceof an enduringand distinctive cluster of culturaltraits.Second, we findthatInglehart'smeasuresof
cultureare sensitiveto short-term
fluctuations
in economic growthrates
and thelevel of unemployment.
This sensitivity
variesby indicator,moreover: levels of life satisfactionand postmaterialism
are systematically
affectedby economicgrowthrates,butare relativelyinsensitiveto levels of
22Toduplicate
Inglehart's
procedure
moreclosely,we also performed
bivariate
regressionsbetweenhis measuresof cultureand current
economicgrowth
rates.Out of seven
regressions,
we initially
foundtwo significant
relationships.
The estimates
forTrustand
werebothstatistically
oftheleverage
percent
Revolutionary
significant
(p < .02).Inspection
effects
plotsrevealed,
however,
thatbothrelationships
weredependent
uponthedistorting
ofinfluential
points(BollenandJackman
1990).In theformer,
thevaluesforSouthAfrica
andArgentina
drovetherelationship;
whilein thelatter,
themeasureforSouthAfricawas
forthedistortion.
Withthesecases removed,
responsible
thep valuesincreased
to .30 and
.42,respectively.
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On theotherhand,the oppositepatternobtainsforlevels
unemployment.
of trustand the percentageof women who discuss politics.Finally,our
analyseschallengetheclaim that"culture" has any systematiceffectson
eitherpoliticaldemocracyor economicgrowth.

Conclusions
Our purposehas been to evaluate the generalclaims advanced in the
two leadingrecentstudiesof politicalculture.Centralto thoseanalysesis
theidea thatpoliticalculturesstemfromdistinctiveand coherentconfigurationsof attitudesacross broad groupsof citizens.The available survey
data reportedby Inglehart(1990), however,do notwarrantthisconclusion.
The correlationsamong the aggregateindicatorsof mass value priorities
are relativelymodestin size (on average,about .50), and therefore
cannot
be used as evidence of a coherentconfiguration
of mass value priorities.
Putnam'sanalyses(1993) do notdirectlyaddressthisissue: whilethestatistical evidence indicatesthathis indicatorsof civic culturecan be used to
generatea unidimensionalmeasure,themeaningof theresultingmeasure
is unclear,and thisproblemis compoundedby the factthatthe measure
does not focus directlyon clustersof attitudes.
Second, we have foundno evidence fordurable culturalsyndromes.
This durability
ofcultureis pivotalto bothPutnam'sand Inglehart'sclaims:
culturalnormspersistover thelong term(measuredoccasionallyin centuries by Putnam),and are only slightlymodifiedin theshortterm.We provide evidencethatInglehart'smeasuresof politicalcultureare influenced
factors(unemployment
and economicgrowth).
significantly
by short-term
We find,moreover,thatthedegreeof sensitivity
to theseshort-term
factors
variesby indicator,withlife satisfaction
and postmaterialism
significantly
affectedbyeconomicgrowthoverthepreviousdecade,butrelativelyinsensitiveto levels of unemployment,
and the oppositepatternoccurringfor
the measuresof trustand revolutionary
sentiments.
Putnam'sdata do not
allow us to gauge the durabilityof culturalnorms,because theydo not
reflectattitudinal
configurations.
Finally,we have foundno evidenceto suggestthatculturalfactorshave
any systematiceffectson politicaland economicoutcomes.In the Italian
betweentheoverallmeasuresof culture
case, thereare strongcorrelations
and "institutional
performance"discussedbyPutnam(1993). Ourreexaminationof thedata suggests,however,thattheseare an artifact
of Putnam's
of
particularapplicationof principalcomponentsanalysis,not a reflection
causal relationship.
any underlying
Indeed,we findno evidenceto suggest
thattheindicatorsexaminedbyPutnamcan be meaningfully
combinedinto
an overall measureof politicalperformance.
Separateregressionanalyses
employingtheindividualcomponentindicatorsofinstitutional
performance
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reveal thatthevast majorityof thecoefficients
are indistinguishable
from
zero, usingconventionalstatisticalcriteria.
Turningto differencesacross the industrialdemocracies,we findno
systematic
linkagebetweenanyof Inglehart'smeasuresof cultureand subsequenteconomic growth.Althougha correlationdoes exist betweenthe
yearsof democraticexperienceand theconfiguration
of mass value priorities,thisassociationconflatesdemocracywithstability.
Inglehart'sanalysis
suffersfromselectionbias, moreover,since almostall of the countriesin
his sampleare highlydemocratic.These problemsundermineanyattempts
to drawthecausal inferencesimpliedby theculturalaccountfromtheobservedcorrelationsbetween"culture" and "democracy."
Would different
researchdesignsobviatesome of theseempiricaldifficultiesand generatemoreconvincingsupportfora culturalapproach?We
thinknot,on two counts.First,Putnam'sand Inglehart'sstudiesare easily
the most extensiveempiricalstatementson behalfof political culturein
recentyears,and theyareaccountsthathave receivedconsiderableacclaim.
Besides, the resultswe have reportedin thispaper parallel the failureof
otherstudiesto linkculturewithratesof mass politicalparticipation
(e.g.,
Powell 1986; Jackman1987; Jackmanand Miller 1995), a patternofparticularsignificance
giventhatearlierstudiesof politicalculture(e.g., Almond
and Verba 1963) wereprimarily
concernedwithadvancingour knowledge
of mass politicalbehavior.We thusconcludethatthegeneralexplanatory
value of politicalcultureis, at best,limited.
thetheoretSecond,followingHirschman(1984), we have underscored
ical continuitieslinkingtheearlierstudieswithcurrentstudiesof political
culture,and notedthe Weberianoriginsof both.The originalstudiesof
political culture,of course, drew heavilyon anthropologicalanalyses of
cultureof the 1950s and 1960s. It is important
to understand,
however,that
thelatterhave morerecentlycome underincreasingcriticismby anthropola romanogistsforempiricalinaccuracies,excessiveculturaldeterminism,
tic culturalrelativism,and a fundamental
tendencytowardpost hoc explanation(e.g., Spiro 1987, esp. chaps. 1, 2; Brown 1991; Billig 1994).
Giventheabove,further
to refineand testthecase forpolitical
attempts
culturealong thelines we have addressedseem unlikelyto be productive.
We believe it may provefruitful
to recastthepuzzle in moreinstitutional
terms,and in theprocess to endogenizepoliticalculture(again, adopting
Hirschman'ssuggestion).23
We have alreadynotedthatinstitutional
varia23Inthisvein,an important
recentanalysisof theSicilianMafiaidentifies
theweaknessesofthecommonsubcultural
explanation
ofthephenomenon
summarized
byPutnam
(1993,146-8)andarguesinstead
thatdistrust
is endogenous,
a characteristic
thatis perpetuatedandexpandedbyorganized
crime(Gambetta
1993).Trust,ofcourse,is central
toPutnam'sandInglehart's
treatment
ofcivicvirtue.
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tionsprovidea parsimoniousand powerfulexplanationof politicalparticiofcourse,
democracies.Such an argument,
pationratesacrosstheindustrial
rates,butcan be elaboratedto helpaccount
to voterturnout
is notrestricted
moregenerally.
forpoliticalperformance
Distinctiveto thisapproachare thepropositionsthatinstitutions-poof incentivesfor
litical,social, and economic-structurethe distribution
individualaction,and thatindividualsoptimizein view of thoseconstraints
available
change alterstheopportunities
(Riker 1990, 172).24Institutional
to politicalactors,and,even allowingforsome stickiness,therebymodifies
the behaviorof those actors.In contrastto the culturalargument,which
as given,thisperspectivedirectsour
essentiallytakesincentivestructures
structures
withinwhich key political figures
attentionto the opportunity
make strategicchoices (e.g., Geddes 1994; Strom,Budge, and Laver 1994;
Jackmanand Volpert1996), and thusrestorespoliticalconsiderationsto a
centralanalyticrole.
forms
It could perhapsbe counteredthatdifferencesin institutional
themselvessimplyreflectculturalvariations.The problemthenis thatinstitutionsare divorcedfromtheirpoliticalorigins.We thinkitmoreprofitable
as the resultof conflictover the allocationof valued
to cast institutions
goods. Phrased differently,institutionsreflect ". . . the effortsof some to

constrainthe actions of otherswithwhom theyinteract"(Knight 1992,
butare
by thisreckoningdo notrevealculturaldifferences
19). Institutions
strategiesof groupsto achieve distribuinsteadproductsof interdependent
tionalgains (Shepsle 1989). As Knightpointsout,moreover,"to theextent
effectson social outcomes,thesubstanthatsuchrulescan have substantive
thatmotivates
tive contentof those rules should reflectthe self-interest
thus
acquire stability
these claims and actions" (1992, 38). Institutions
rules
of
the
game accept those
whengroupswiththeresourcesto alterthe
sufficient
with
power are
changeoccurswhengroup(s)
rules;institutional
this
institutions
condithose
rules.
In
able to challengeand transform
way,
resources.
and
social
tionthedistribution
of bothpolitical
3 February1995.
Manuscriptsubmitted
Final manuscriptreceived24 August1995.

Forexample,
Greiftreats
them
terms.
valuesarecastin similar
24Occasionally,
cultural
to actionsthatothers
will
withrespect
individual's
expectations
as thebeliefs"thatcapture
from
substantially
(1994,915).Notethatthisusagediverges
takeinvariouscontingencies"
valuesas a component
anddealswithcultural
indiscussions
ofpolitical
culture,
thatcommon
arrangements.
ofinstitutional
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APPENDIX
Inglehart'sIndicatorsof PoliticalCulture
1. Feelingsof overalllifesatisfactionare generatedfromthefollowingques-

tion:

Generallyspeaking,how satisfiedare yourwithyourlife as a whole? Would
you say thatyou are verysatisfied,fairlysatisfied,not verysatisfied,or not

1990,25-6).
at all satisfied?
(Inglehart

"very
reporting
is revealedby theproportion
The nationallevelof satisfaction
that
attitude
observes,
thisis a verydiffuse
satisfied"in thesample.As Inglehart
of themoment,
so thatcrossdoes notreflect
politicalor economicperformance
enduring"
(1990,25).
in thisorientation
are "remarkably
nationaldifferences
fromthefollowing
item:
trust"areidentified
2. Levelsof "interpersonal
Now I wouldliketo ask youabouthowmuchyouwouldtrust
peoplefrom
inyouropinion,
they
variouscountries.
Foreachcountry,
pleasesaywhether,
notparticularly
trustworthy,
aregenerally
fairly
trustworthy,
verytrustworthy,
or notat all trustworthy
(Inglehart
1990,34).
most
in eachcountry
identifying
by thepercentage
Levelsof trustaremeasured
as veryor fairly
trustworthy.
peopleof their"own nationality"
in responses
ofthecurrent
socialorderaremanifested
3. and4. Evaluations
to thefollowing
item:
concerning
[SHOW CARD] On thiscardarethreebasickindsof attitudes
your
thekindofsocietywe livein.Pleasechoosetheone thatbestdescribes

own opinion:

mustbe radically
changedbyrevo1. Theentire
wayoursocietyis organized
action.
lutionary
byreforms.
improved
2. Oursocietymustbe gradually
3. Our presentsocietymustbe valiantlydefendedagainstall subversive
forces.

of politicalculture(percent
revolutionary
thirdand fourth
indicators
Inglehart's
and conservative,
comefromresponsesto options1 and 3 on this
respectively)
item.
aretappedbythefollowing
5. Levelsof politicaldiscussion
question:
Whenyou gettogether
withyourfriends,
wouldyou say thatyou discuss
or never?
frequently,
occasionally,
politicalmatters
to
ourattention
For thereasonsadvancedby Inglehart
(1990,50-2), we restrict
or
thepercentage
of womenreporting
thattheydiscusspoliticseitherfrequently
occasionally.
fromitemsaskingpeopleto
valuesareinferred
6. Materialist/postmaterialist
rankthefollowing
1990,74-5):
goals(Inglehart
A. Maintainorderin thenation
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B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Give people more say in the government
Fightrisingprices
Protectfreedomof speech
Maintaina highrateof economic growth
Make sure thatthiscountryhas strongdefenseforces
Give people moresay in how thingsare decided at workand in theircommunity
H. Try to make our cities and countrysidemorebeautiful
I. Maintaina stable economy
J. Fightagainstcrime
less impersonalsociety
K. Move towarda friendlier,
L. Move towarda societywhereideas countmorethanmoney

(In some of his analysesIngleharthas reliedon thefirstfouritemswhile on other
occasions he has employedall 12. It is not clear which set is used in Inglehart
[ 1988 or 1990,chap. 1]. Eitherway,notethatitemssuchas B, D, and G specifically
thediscussionof themeaningof these
emphasizedemocraticvalues. Note further
itemsby Clarke and Dutt [1991], and by Duch and Taylor [1993].)
Postmaterialist
values are said to stem froma decreasingemphasison economicand physcialsecurityaccompaniedby an increasingemphasison nonmaterial needs, "such as a sense of community
and thequalityof life" (Inglehart1990,
56). FollowingInglehart,we focuson thepercentageof thepopulationexpressing
values.
materialistvalues minusthe percentageexpressingnonmaterialist
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